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Directorate of Intelligence

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DI PD 95-009CX
SC 01859/95
29 September 1995

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Proliferation Digest

September 1995

Page

Perspective

Highlights

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~~DPD 95-009CX~~

~~SC 01859/95~~

~~29 September 1995~~

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
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


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SC 01859/95



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


**Indonesia Continuing To Emphasize Defensive Chemical and
Biological Warfare Research**

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


 the Indonesian
Subdirector of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare
(NUBIKA) is continuing to maintain a defensive chemical warfare
(CW) and biological warfare (BW) research program. Although the
Indonesian Armed Forces had considered an offensive CW and BW
capability for NUBIKA in the late 1970s, these efforts were
terminated in the early 1980s as a result of fiscal and resource
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 Indonesia's programs remain defensive in nature.



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Indonesia Continuing To Emphasize Defensive Chemical and Biological Warfare Research [redacted]

[redacted] the Indonesian Subdirector of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Warfare (NUBIKA) is continuing to maintain a defensive chemical warfare (CW) and biological warfare (BW) research program. Although the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) had considered an offensive CW and BW capability for NUBIKA in the late 1970s, these efforts were terminated in the early 1980s as a result of fiscal and resource constraints. [redacted]

[redacted] Indonesia's programs remain defensive in nature. [redacted]

Program's History

NUBIKA was established in 1969 to gain information and expertise on defensive capabilities required to operate in a nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare environment. Its initial task was to investigate the tactical application of defoliants and the effect of other chemical and biological agents and establish a defensive capability within the ABRI. Indonesia's leadership—acutely aware of the use of defoliants in Vietnam—was particularly concerned about protecting the country's farmland from potential CW or BW attacks. [redacted]

[redacted] in the late 1970s and early 1980s NUBIKA also sought to develop offensive CW and BW capabilities. [redacted] plans called for the eventual development and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Toward this end, NUBIKA placed scientists in Army and civilian institutions for two- to three-year terms to study various aspects of offensive and defensive chemical and biological warfare. [redacted]

Forgoing the Offensive Program

[redacted] in 1982 the newly appointed commander of Indonesia's armed forces, Gen. Leonardus Murdani, ordered a halt in NUBIKA's

efforts to develop offensive CW and BW capabilities. The reporting indicated that Gen. Murdani opposed the development of an offensive CW and BW capability because of concerns that such weapons would be used only in defense and would result in substantial Indonesian civilian casualties. [redacted]

Financial constraints also impeded development.

[redacted] in 1984 ABRI had very little defensive CW and BW equipment, which was used primarily for demonstration purposes. Development of defensive CW and BW capabilities was given a higher priority after the reorganization of the armed forces in 1985, when NUBIKA became a directorate under the Army Engineers. Training courses in defensive CW and BW operations have been conducted since 1985, with some NUBIKA personnel being sent for training overseas, most to the United States, but some to France. [redacted]

[redacted] ABRI's chemical and biological warfare programs have a defensive orientation. In 1988 and again in 1990, a team from NUBIKA was dispatched to Iran to investigate the aftermath of a CW offensive launched by the Iraqis, probably to help NUBIKA further develop its defensive capabilities. [redacted]


In the early 1990s even the defensive program came under scrutiny, and some efforts—later reversed—were taken to curtail the program:

- [redacted] the startup of a NUBIKA project for the laboratory-scale synthesis of mustard agents probably would be delayed because of a lack of specialized laboratory facilities.


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DI PD 95-009CX
SC 01859/95
29 September 1995


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NUBIKA'S Organization



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[redacted] some of NUBIKA's research was to be frozen for an indefinite period as a result of an ABRI assessment that the use of CW and BW agents against Indonesia was only a remote possibility during the next 10 to 20 years (see inset).

[redacted] in 1993 the ABRI Commander reversed this decision and directed the organization to continue its activities until 1998 and not to lessen its efforts to improve its chemical warfare know-how. [redacted]

Indonesia's Threat Perceptions

[redacted] Indonesia perceives no major external military threat in the foreseeable future. In the long term, however, Jakarta regards China, with its offensive CW and BW programs, as a potential threat to the region—a concern reinforced by Beijing's rapid economic growth, ongoing military modernization program, and reluctance to clarify its ambiguous claim in the South China Sea. Indonesian officials are also concerned that over time Japan could reemerge as a military power, especially if Tokyo's security relationship with the United States deteriorates. In addition, Jakarta also harbors suspicions of some neighbors—a legacy of old conflicts and an unresolved boundary dispute with Malaysia. [redacted]

Jakarta's primary security focus is on maintaining domestic security. It conducts ongoing counterinsurgency operations in the provinces of Irian Jaya and East Timor, which it annexed in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. The approximately 10,000 troops in East Timor conduct small-scale security operations and bolster the government's extensive civic action programs. The armed forces also play a key role in maintaining domestic order and stability. [redacted]

Concerns About Indonesia's Program Abating

Although Indonesia is a signatory of the Chemical Warfare Convention, Jakarta has not yet ratified the Convention. The anticrop defoliants being tested at several facilities are not considered to be toxic chemical agents, and NUBIKA's research and testing of such defoliants is not precluded by the Convention. Nonetheless, because of the continuation of CW- and BW-related research and the potential for any program to become offensive—following a political decision to do so—the Intelligence Community will continue to monitor and seek information on Indonesia's CW- and BW-related activities. [redacted]

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SC 01859/95